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Jordan is the first Arab country which agreed to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US. 
JUSFTA contains Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) plus clauses which 
affect Jordan’s access to medicine by raising the price of drugs, delaying generic entry of medication 
into the market and therefore limiting access to medicines. Concerns with FTAs have been highlighted 
by Abbott in that FTAs limit flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, establish strict marketing 
exclusivity and do not allow exceptions for fair or non-commercial use.1  
 
 The author examines recommendations by the Jordanian Food and Drug Administration (JFDA) and 
explains the workability of these recommendations. The author uses examples from countries which 
have signed FTAs with the US and have successfully curtailed the negative effects of FTAs in an 
attempt to assist developing countries that have been subjected to similar restrictive clauses. The 
author also recommends further available options which the  Jordanian government can utilise to limit 
the negative impacts of TRIPS-plus clauses within their national laws.  
 
The author concludes that the Jordanian government can implement national laws that do not 














                                               
1 F. M. Abbott, ‘The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and 
Health’, 2005. Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property And Access To Medicines, p. 31 and 32 , P. Roffe, G. 
Tansey and D. Vivas-Eugui, eds., Earthscan, 2005 ; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper; FSU 
College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988461  
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Jordan: Data Exclusivity  and Jordan’s Food and Drug Administration’s (JFDA)  
recommendations 
Jordanian officials have started to recognise the negative impact of data exclusivity as can be seen 
through the JFDA’s submissions to the UN High Level Panel below.  The author examines these 
recommendations to explore their workability in an attempt to scale back the negative effects of  
TRIPS-plus and data exclusivity, specifically.  
Data exclusivity operates as a ‘ wholly distinct form of intellectual property rights and could not be 
overcome by a compulsory license.’2 Furthermore, TRIPS protects only ‘undisclosed data’ to prevent 
‘unfair commercial use’; it does not confer either exclusive rights or an automatic period of marketing 
monopoly.3 TRIPS does not define what constitutes ‘commercial use.4 There have been arguments for 
data exclusivity in that it incentivises innovation of pharmaceutical drugs and assists pharmaceutical 
companies recoup the costs of clinical trials and clinical trial data transparency.5 These arguments 
have been refuted on the basis that a few years of patent protection is adequate to recover the cost of 
clinical trials as US companies, for example, have made an excess of USD 1 billion on 55 
‘blockbuster’ drugs in 2013.6 
As part of Jordan’s WTO’s accession package Jordan agreed to block registration and marketing 
approval of generic medicine for five years, ‘even when no patents exist’ 7. This has been 
implemented through the Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition Draft Law, which had been referred 
                                               
2 The Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturing Group of America (PhRMA) , PhRMA “Special 301” 
Submission 185 (2005), available at members.phrma.org/international/PhRMA_2005_Special_301.pdf (arguing 
that CAFTA “does not permit exceptions to data exclusivity”); Letter from Martin Terberger, Head of 
Consumer Goods (Pharmaceuticals) Unit, European Commission on Enterprise and Industry Directorate-
General, to Greg Perry, European Generic Medicines Association (Feb. 20, 2006), available at 
www.cptech.org/ip/health/dataexcl/ec-de-tamiflu.pdf (“The European pharmaceutical legislation does not 
foresee any exception to the above-mentioned periods of 8 year data exclusivity and 10 years marketing 
protection in case of emergency situations or in case a compulsory patent licence [sic] has been granted by an 
EU Member State”), B. Baker ,‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage’ American Journal of Law and Medicine, 2008, 34(2/3), 303–44. 
doi:10.1177/009885880803400209 ( Baker 2008 hereafter). 
3 R. Malpani, "All costs, no benefits: How TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules in the US-Jordan FTA affect 
access to medicines.", Oxfam briefing paper no. 102. Oxford: Oxfam International; 2007. available at 
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/114080/bp102-all-costs-no-benefits-trips-
210307-en.pdf%3Bjsessionid%3D089750820CF675173F0C3204C369D63F%3Fsequence%3D1 , last accessed 
on 12 November 2018  (hereafter Malpani 2007) 
4 L.Diependaele , J.Cockbain  S.Sterckx , ‘Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the Developing World 
– The Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity’. Developing World Bioethics. 2017;17(1):11-21. 
doi:10.1111/dewb.12105. (Diependaele et al hereafter) 
5 Ibid 
6 EvaluatePharma. 2014. World Preview 2014, Outlook to 2020. Available 
at: http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/images/EP240614.pdf, Diependaele et al 
7 Ibid. See also WTO’s The Working Party on the Accession to Jordan dated 3 December 1999 – WTO- ‘Report 
of the Working Party on the accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the World Trade Organization’ at 
Paragraph 215 available at file:///Users/lailabarqawi/Downloads/JOR33%20(2).pdf. 
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to Parliament in November 19998 and is now Article 8 of Jordan’s Law No.15 of 2000 on Unfair 
Competition and Trade Secrets (UCTS). 9This is clearly TRIPS-plus in nature.  
 
Moreover, restrictions by JUSFTA also require three further years for data exclusivity for new uses 
which clearly is an excessive form of protection for an existing TRIPS-plus condition.  
 
The effect of this restricted use of data exclusivity is evidenced by the registered 103 medicines which 
were launched since 2001 that had no patent protection in Jordan; of these at least 79% had no 
competition from a generic equivalent as a consequence of data exclusivity.10 This demonstrates the 
argument proclaiming that data exclusivity limits competition.  This does not only have competition 
implications but financial ones as well. For example, an analysis funded by the Medicines 
Transparency Alliance estimated that delayed market entry of generics resulting from TRIPS-plus 
requirements in JUSFTA cost consumers in Jordan’s retail market US$ 18 million in 2004.11 
The Jordanian government should implement the recommendations in this article with backing from 
the US because the US is the main financer to Jordan’s economy.12 Furthermore, defying the US 
means that countries such as India, which challenge the US on IP, feature regularly on the US’s 
‘Priority Watch List’ in its 301 reports. For example the USTR’s 2018 Special 301 Report clearly 
states that India has ‘Longstanding IP challenges facing US businesses in India’.13  
The author examines the JFDA’s recommendations below:  
1. “Shortening the term of data exclusivity for new chemical entity: neither TRIPS nor Jordan-
US FTA request the five years.” 14 
                                               
8 The Working Party on the Accession to Jordan dated 3 December 1999 – WTO- ‘Report of the Working Party 
on the accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the World Trade Organization’.  
9 This states: ‘Article 8 If an official party stipulated, for approving for the marketing of pharmaceuticals, or 
agrochemical products in which new chemical materials are used, the submission of secret formulae or any data 
attained through considerable efforts such party should observe the following: A. The protection of such data 
from the unclassified commercial use, through preventing any other person who did not obtain the applicant 
approval from depending thereon for marketing his pharmaceuticals and products except after 5 years as of the 
date of the applicant obtaining any approval for marketing his products.’ Available at WIPO Lex 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/128322 . 
 
10 Malpani 2007, See also Diependaele et al  
11 R.B.Abbott , R.Bader , L. Bajjali , TA.El Samen,  T.Obeidat , H.Sboul et al. The price of medicines in Jordan: 
the cost of trade-based intellectual property. Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business 
Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector. 2012;9:75-85. (Hereafter R.B.Abbott et al) 
12 A. Younes, ‘ Jordan's economic crisis threatens political stability’, 14 February 2018, Available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/jordan-economic-crisis-threatens-political-stability-
180214112245542.html 
13  USTR  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018%20Special%20301.pdf  
14  Hayel Obaidat, Wael Armouti and Wesal Haqaish ,Jordan Food Drug Administration submissions to the UN 
High Level Panel Report, 28 February 2016, 
https://highlevelpaneldevelopment.squarespace.com/inbox/2016/2/28/dr-hayel-obaidat-obaidat  (Hereafter 
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As mentioned above, Jordan has gone  beyond its TRIPS obligations to provide five years of 
protection for data  exclusivity.15 To this effect Jordan should repeal Article 8 of Jordan’s Law No.15 
on Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets Law which reduces data exclusivity protection to 3 years as 
per JUSFTA.  
Jordan should continue its efforts to re-define what constitutes a New Chemical Entity (NCE) . Jordan 
has succeeded in re-defining what an NCE is as per a circular dated 16 June 2009, by the JFDA’s 
director general which states: 
‘A New Chemical Entity is the pharmaceutical product that contains active moiety or moieties that is 
responsible for physiological or pharmacological effect whereby no more than eighteen months have 
elapsed from the date of first registration of any of its ingredients (components) singly or collectively 
in any country in the world irrespective of any difference in, including but not limited to, type of salt, 
ester, isomer, complex or other derivative. A pharmaceutical product shall be considered to have the 
same chemical entity even if there is a difference in polymorph, metabolite, enantiomer, solvate, size 
of particles, formulation, combination, or method of use, pharmaceutical dosage form or 
concentration.’16  
Jordan has also excluded ismoers and new crystalline forms within its NCE definition.17  
The author discusses how Jordan could restrict the definition of an NCE further below. 
2. “Start Date of Data Exclusivity: a country can consider that the start date for granting data 
exclusivity is the first registration of the product worldwide.” 18 
Jordan’s start date of data exclusivity is on the date of first registration of a medicine in Jordan. This 
is pursuant to Article 4.22 of JUSFTA. Jordan could amend its laws to reflect the above as other 
                                               
JFDA submissions to the UN) , See also W. Armouti & M. Nsour, ‘Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: Was 
It the Best Choice for Jordan Under The US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement?’, 1 August 2016, Oregon Review of 
International Law : Volume 17, Number 2 (2016) [4] available on 
https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/Nsour.pdf  (Hereafter Armouti and Nsour 2016)  
15 Article 8 of Jordan’s Law No. 15 of 2000 on Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128321  provides for 5 years of data exclusivity protection & 
JUSFTA at Article 4 paragraph 22 footnote 10 provides for 3 years of data exclusivity protection. 
16  “Translation adopted by the JFDA. Circulation No. 2/9/1/17645, June 16, 2009” available on 
http://www.jfda.jo/EchoBusV3.0/SystemAssets/bd34fdc1-4ad9-48e5-b5a5-4b4250ea3d8e.tif, Armouti and 
Nsour 2016  
17  Ibid. Jordan’s redefinition of an NCE was a contested issue in 2013. Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) argued 
that Jordan’s definition of an NCE violated Article 8 of the UCTS and Article 39.3 of TRIPS. The case was 
dismissed on grounds that the case was brought against the wrong entity without discussion of the technical 
issues of the NCE. Merck Sharp & Dohme et al. v. Jordanian Food & Drug Administration, Decision of the 
Jordanian High Court of Justice No. 512/2003, (Jan. 1, 2013), as cited in Armouti and Nsour 2016 
18  Supra 20 
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countries have done. For instance, Peru’s Legislative Decree allows five-year term of data exclusivity 
protection ‘to start concurrently from the date the product is approved in other countries with high 
sanitary monitoring or approval regime.’19 
Jordan could attempt to go farther in decreasing the existing negative effect of data exclusivity 
specifically as per the Chilean example by amending its national laws to limit pharmaceutical data 
protection availability to the year following grant of marketing approval which means that drugs’ test 
data not marketed within the year are not protected so that the period of protection for the 
pharmaceutical test data starts early.20 
3.  “JFDA should examine the test data protection conditions before granting data exclusivity: 
Then, JFDA can issue a protection certificate confirming complaint of data exclusivity 
conditions” 21 
The JFDA, in its capacity to register drugs,22  does not scrutinise test data protection and check 
whether it has been granted previously or not,23and relies on the applicant’s declaration.24 This 
recommendation requires specialised patent examiners that will be able to assess and examine test 
data protection conditions to grant data exclusivity.   
4. “Undisclosed test data: this should be defined in the registration criteria and JFDA should 
examine this condition by requesting a certificate from the originator company declaring that 
the submitted test data have not been published by any means or in any way. If the data become 
non-confidential, then the JFDA has the right to end the data exclusivity period.” 25 
The JFDA, currently, request that clinical trials ,of phase III, be published. This does not fulfil the 
requirement of data confidentiality at Article 39.3 of TRIPS. 26To this effect JFDA grants five years of 
                                               
19 Article 3 of Peru’s Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14, 2009, art. 2 (Peru), 
M.K.El-Said, (2016) ,TRIPS-Plus, Public Health and Performance-Based Rewards Schemes Options and 
Supplements for Policy Formation in Developing and Least Developed Countries, American University 
International Law Review: Vol. 31: Iss. 3, Article 2. Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol31/iss3/2  (El-Said 2016 hereafter). 
20 Law No. 19,039 art. 90, septiembre 30, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.](Chile) (modified on December 1, 
2005 by Law 19,996, rmias Tekeste Biadgleng & Jean-Christophe Maur, The Influence of Preferential Trade 
Agreements on the Implementation of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: A First Look 1, 21 
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 33, 2011); El-Said 2016. 
21  Supra 20 
22 JFDA’s website, http://www.jfda.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=180  
23 R.B. Abbott et al as quoted in Armouti and Nsour 2016 
24 Correa 2002, Armouti and Nsour 2016 
25  Supra 20 
26 Malpani 2007,  See also Armouti and Nsour 2016. 
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data exclusivity without checking “whether data submitted for regulatory approval has been 
previously disclosed.” 27The JFDA, however, assesses ‘the published data of Phase III.’28’  
Undisclosed clinical trial data is a universal issue and various initiatives have been formed to tackle 
this.29 A study conducted recently has shown that only “57% of clinical trial results for a new drug are 
made publicly available.” 30 
Jordan may implement national laws to state that if a summary of clinical studies “or of information 
in scientific literature” is publicly available then this is “sufficient to consider the test data as 
disclosed.”31 For instance, in accordance with a policy applied since January 2015 by the European 
Medicines Agency, the information about clinical studies cannot be considered “commercial 
confidential information”.32  
While “clinical reports may not be used to support a MAA [marketing authorisation application]/ 
extensions or variations to a MAA nor to make any unfair commercial use of the clinical reports” 33 
the restriction does not change the nature of the information as disclosed to the extent that it is 
publicly available. 34 In this context, Jordan could argue that such disclosures are sufficient to negate 
data exclusivity of a drug.   
5. “Considerable efforts: this should be defined in the registration criteria and JFDA should 
examine this condition by requesting evidence from the originator company to show that the 
generation of the submitted test data involved considerable efforts by reporting the cost and 
the period involved in the generation of the submitted test data.”35 
                                               
27 R. B. Abbott et al. as cited in Armouti and Nsour 2016 
28 Ibid 
29 J. Miller, ‘How full disclosure of clinical trial data will benefit the pharmaceutical industry’ , The 
Pharmaceutical Journal, 15 June 2016 available at https://www.pharmaceutical-
journal.com/opinion/comment/how-full-disclosure-of-clinical-trial-data-will-benefit-the-pharmaceutical-
industry/20201274.article  ( Hereafter Miller 2016) , and European Medicines Agency, European Medicines 
Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal products for human use, 2014, p. 4, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf   
30 Miller 2016, JE Miller, D. Korn ,  and JS Ross ,’Clinical trial registration, reporting, publication and FDAAA 
compliance: a cross-sectional analysis and ranking of new drugs approved by the FDA in 2012’, BMJ Open 
2015;5:e009758. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2015-009758    
31 C. M. Correa, ‘Mitigating The Regulatory Constraints Imposed By Intellectual Property Rules Under Free 
Trade Agreements’, Research Paper 47 South Centre, February 2017, available at 
https://www.southcentre.int/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/RP74_Mitigating-the-Regulatory-Constraints-Imposed-
by-IntellectualProperty-Rules-under-Free-Trade-Agreements_EN-1.pdf  ( Correa 2017 hereafter) 
32 European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for 
medicinal products for human use, 2014, p. 4, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf, Correa 2017 
33 Ibid 
34 Correa 2017 
35  Supra 20 
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Jordan does not examine the considerable effort element36 or have a definition37 for it despite it being 
a requirement of Article 39.3 of TRIPS. The JFDA should define this and require the originator 
company to submit a declaration or certificate stating how conditions are fulfilled. This 
recommendation is straightforward and is in line with other countries policies such as Peru. Peru’s 
Legislative Decree protects cases if “generating it has involved considerable efforts” and therefore the 
submission of undisclosed test data is “necessary to determine the safety and efficiency of such 
product.”38  
This has been applied by Colombia’s Decree 2085 of 2002 which introduced 7 exceptions where the 
most relevant, to this recommendation, states that “protection does not apply to:1. Test data that are 
already in the public domain or have not involved considerable effort from the patent applicant to 
produce.39 ” 
The benefit of fulfilling this recommendation is that Jordan will be able to ‘protect  information 
against unfair commercial use’ as stipulated in Article 4.22 of JUSFTA40 without having this as an 
ambiguous term which they are not able to utilise. Achieving this will be in line with Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS as well as an advantage to use Article 4.22 of JUSFTA.  
6.  “Data exclusivity term should not extend beyond the patent term.” 41 
                                               
36 Haqaish interview in Armouti and Nsour 2016. 
37 Ibid 
38 Article 1 of Peru’s Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14, 2009, art. 2 (Peru), 
El-Said 2016. Available at: h p://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol31/iss3/2 
39 Republica de Colombia Ministerio de Salud. Decreto Numero 2085 de 2002, as cited in Rodríguez-Garavito, 
C.(2014-03-13). A Golden Straitjacket?: The Struggle over Patents and Access to Medicines in Colombia. In 
Balancing Wealth and Health: The Battle over Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines in Latin America. : 
Oxford University Press. Retrieved 26 Mar. 2018, from 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676743.001.0001/acprof-9780199676743-
chapter-6 . (Hereafter Rodríguez-Garavito 2014) 
40 Article 4.22 of JUSFTA states: ‘ Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when requiring, as a condition 
of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products that utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, or evidence of approval in another country, 
the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such information against unfair 
commercial use. In addition, each Party shall protect such information against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the information is protected against unfair 
commercial use.’ At footnotes 10 and 11 of Article 4.22 this states: ‘It is understood that protection for “new 
chemical entities” shall also include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for a period of three 
years.’ And ‘It is understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of approval in another 
country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information against unfair commercial use for the same period 
of time the other country is protecting such information against unfair commercial use’. JUSFTA 
41  Supra 20 
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A study on medicine affordability in Jordan concluded that medicine prices required review to 
provide inexpensive medication to the poor. 42 Almost 32% of the Jordanian population is not insured 
and will have to finance its own needs. 43  A further issue that was highlighted in the said study is that 
‘the government is purchasing originator brands where lower-priced generics are available, which 
points to a lack of efficiency’. 44 
This clearly warrants a reviewing exercise by the JFDA to examine existing patented medication. 
JFDA should then produce a list of available inexpensive medication alternatives.  
JFDA has been implementing a ‘standing operating policy’ which welcomes generic version 
applications from an innovator during the final year of protection which allows prompt registration of 
affordable generic drugs. 45This policy , if applied effectively, could also ensure that the patent term 
will be monitored and that data exclusivity terms will not extend beyond the patent term .  
7.  “Allow registration of the generic product for the purposes of export.” 46 
This recommendation is straightforward and is self-explanatory. Israel, for example, has removed its 
trade barriers and therefore allows for a generic product to be registered during the exclusivity period 
of the originator product for the purposes of export.47  
8. “Grounds for revocation of the data exclusivity period: such as anti-competitive practices of 
the originator company: high prices, delay in marketing the product more than six months 
from approval date, stop marketing for more than six months or insufficient marketing of the 
product.” 48 
As mentioned previously JUSFTA is the only FTA  which does not stipulate grounds for pre-grant or 
limit grounds of revocation49. This should be defined within Jordan’s national legislation because the 
status quo means that originator companies will not be reprimanded for various acts. The author 
                                               
42 R. Bader et al, Medicine Prices, Availability and Affordability in Jordan, Report of a survey conducted in 
2004 in Amman, Irbid, Zarqa and Karak using the WHO/HAI price measurement methodology, August 2007, 
available on http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js17749en/ (Hereafter Bader 2007) 
43 Ibid  
44 Ibid 
45 JFDA submissions to the UN 
46  Supra 20 
47 A. Christie et al., ‘Review of Pharmaceutical Patent Extension and Spring boarding Provisions in Various 
Jurisdictions’, 6 November 2002, 4.6.1, available at http://achristie.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/IPRIA-
Patent-Extension-Review-2.pdf . 
48  Supra 20 
49 Krikorian and Szymkowiak 2007 
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would add to the recommendation that grounds of revocation should include acts of inequality, 
misrepresentation and fraud as per the Bahrain-US FTA (BUSFTA). 50   
9. “Waive data exclusivity protection in cases of compulsory licensing: in case of the issuance 
of a compulsory license, the generic company is still required to submit clinical trials. 
Therefore, data exclusivity should be waived in such cases.” 51 
Jordan’s regulations could provide that “data exclusivity shall have no effects against a compulsory 
licensee granted for any of the grounds established under the applicable patent law, or against persons 
authorised to undertake a governmental non-commercial use of the patented product.”52 
Furthermore, Malaysia  adopted similar stances to mitigate the effects of data exclusivity as per 
Section 5 of Malaysia’s 2011 Directive of data exclusivity , entitled ‘Non-Application of Data 
Exclusivity’,  which provides that: 
“Nothing in the Data Exclusivity shall: 
(i) apply to situations where compulsory licenses have been issued or the implementation of any other 
measures consistent with the need to protect public health and ensure access  to medicines for all; or 
(ii)prevent the Government from taking any necessary action to protect public health, national 
security, non-commercial public use, national emergency, public health crisis or other extremely 
urgent circumstances declared by the government.”53 
10. “Waive data exclusivity in cases of emergency and public interest.” 54 
Colombia succeeded in including a clause in its Decree 2085 of 2002 which states that “protection 
does not apply to: 4. Information whose disclosure is necessary to protect the public interest. 55”  
 
                                               
50 BUSFTA is amongst the most restrictive FTAs, however in this instance provides clarification on revocation 
which is not clear in JUSFTA .BUSFTA at Article 14.8.4  limits the grounds for revoking to ‘fraud, 
misrepresentation, or inequitable’. BUSFTA available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/bahrain-fta 
 
51  Supra 20 
52 Correa 2017 
53Arahan Bagi Melaksanakan Data Eksklusiviti Di Malaysia; Bilangan 2 Tahun 2011 (‘Directive’) 
http://npra.moh.gov.my/images/reg-info/DataEx/Directive_on_DE.pdf  
54  Supra 20 




This is an important waiver to include in Jordanian legislation because access to medicine is a human 
right, as stipulated within various international laws such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 at Article 2556, the preamble57 and Article 158 of 1946 Constitution of the World Health 
Organisation and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.59 It is 
arguable that TRIPS and TRIPS-plus clauses are in conflict with human rights clauses, however this 
issue is beyond the scope of this article.  
11. “Waive data exclusivity for products intended for the treatment of life threatening diseases.”60 
The above waivers in the JFDA’s recommendations could be included in Jordan’s national legislation 
laws as exceptions to limit the effects of data exclusivity.61 
The above waivers are embodied within the Chilean legislation which excluded certain areas of the 
law from the scope of protection such as Article 91 of the Chilean law which states: 
“The protection of this Paragraph shall not apply when: 
(a) The owner of the test data referred to in Article 89 has engaged in forms of conduct or practices 
declared as contrary to free competition in direct relation to the use or exploitation of that 
information, according to the final decision of the free competition court. 
(b) For reasons of public health, national security, non-commercial public use, national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency declared by the competent authority, ending the protection 
referred to in Article 89 shall be justified. 
(c) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product is the subject of a compulsory license, 
according to what is established in this Law. 
(d) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has not been marketed in the national 
territory after 12 months from the health certificate or clearance granted in Chile. 
                                               
56Article 25 of the Human Rights Declaration 1948 
57 This stresses on the importance of ‘The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and 
related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.’ 
58 This states: ‘The objective of the World Health Organization (hereinafter called the Organization) shall be the 
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.’ 
59 Health and Human Rights Resource Guide,  available https://www.hhrguide.org/2017/06/09/access-to-
medicines-and-human-rights/#_ftnref10  
60  Supra 20 
61 W. Armouti, and M. Nsour ‘Data Exclusivity For Pharmaceuticals In Free Trade Agreements: Models In 
Selected United States Free Trade Agreements’ , Houston Journal of International Law Vol 40:1, 9 February 
2018 available at http://www.hjil.org/wp-content/uploads/Nsour-FINAL.pdf  (Hereafter Armouti and Nsour 
2018) 
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(e) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has a health certificate or clearance abroad 
that has been in force for over 12 months.”62 
Repeating Test Trials? 
Undoubtedly data exclusivity has a damaging effect on the Jordanian’s public’s access to affordable 
drugs. A solution that has been suggested by academics is that generic manufacturers could explore 
the option of repeating test trials to prove safety and efficacy. However, the ethics of repeating these 
tests is questioned63 and it is a very lengthy process that will strain time and resources that Jordanian 
generic manufacturers may not possess.  
Lenient clauses in JUSFTA?  Compulsory license and Parallel Importation 
JUSFTA contains more lenient clauses when compared with other Arab-US FTAs. For example the 
language used in JUSFTA contains terms which are less formal than BUSFTA with phrases such as 
‘desiring to strengthen the bonds of friendship’.64 JUSFTA’s Article dealing with IP is 4 pages long 
whereas BUSFTA’s IP Chapter is 24 pages long.65 
 
The author refers to Article 4.20 of JUSFTA which deals with compulsory licensing and permits the 
usage of compulsory licensing : (1)as a remedy to an anti-competitive process, (2) ‘in cases of public 
non-commercial use or in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency’, or  (3) ‘on the ground of failure to meet working requirements’.66 This article in effect is a 
                                               
62 P. Roffe, Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: The Challenges of 
Implementation 15 (Oct. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for International 
Environmental Law) (citing Decree No. 153 art. 91, Mechanisms for the Protection of Undisclosed Data, Julio 
20, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)), cited in El-Said 2016  
63 R.G. Cartagena and A. Attaran,  2009. ‘A Study Of Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity Laws In Latin America: 
Is Access To Affordable Medicine Threatened?’ Health Law Journal, 17, pp. 269-96. 
 
64 See JUSFTA’s preamble in comparison with BUSFTA’s preamble. USTR website, BUSFTA available at 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/bahrain-fta  See also USTR, Jordan-US FTA, Side letter 
on marketing approval of pharmaceutical products, Available 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/jordan/asset_upload_file746_8466.pdf, 
65 Similarly see also Oman’s US FTA Chapter 15 dealing with IP which is 25 pages in length available at 
USTR’s website: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset_upload_file715_8809.pdf and Morocco -
US FTA IP Chapter 15 which is 37 pages in length. Available at USTR’s 
website:https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file797_3849.pdf 
66 Article 4.20 of JUSFTA states: states the following:  
 
‘20. Neither Party shall permit the use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder except in the following circumstances:  
 
(a) to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
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clause for Jordan to utilise compulsory licensing and to parallel import to other countries suffering 
from epidemics.  Compulsory licenses and parallel importation, however, have been limited by 
Jordan’s patent laws. Article 22 of Jordan’s National Law on issuing a compulsory license 67resembles 
the  wording in Article 31 (k) of TRIPS.68 However Jordan’s Article 22 , could be amended to allow 
further access to issue a compulsory license. Article 20(c)  of JUSFTA states that ‘failure to meet 
working requirements’ means that a compulsory license could be issued. It is not clear what is meant 
by working requirements and the only ‘utilization’ that is stipulated is importation.69  The ‘non-
working’ requirement of a patent could be defined so that Jordan’s national law is clear on what does 
not constitute ‘working’ or ‘utilising’ a patent.  
 
Furthermore, no time limit is set to meet these ‘working requirements’ within JUSFTA and Jordan 
could repeal the requirement to exploit the patent within 3 or 4 years.  
 
Jordan could follow the Australian example by providing separate provisions for pharmaceutical 
compulsory licensing to further widen the scope of compulsory licensing for  patented drugs.  
 
The above state recommendations that Jordan could implement in its own national law to restrict use 
of compulsory licensing. However, compulsory licensing is further diminished by data exclusivity as 
discussed above.  
Further Recommendations to include in Jordan’s National Legislation: 
Policy Space 
                                               
 (b) in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency, provided that such use is limited to use by government entities or legal entities acting under 
the authority of a government; or  
 
(c) on the ground of failure to meet working requirements, provided that importation shall constitute working.  
 
Where the law of a Party allows for such use pursuant to sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c), the Party shall respect 
the provisions of Article 31 of TRIPS and Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention.’  
 
67 Jordan’s Law No. 71 of 2001 amending the Patent Law which shall be read in conjunction with Jordan’s Law 
No. 32 of 1999 
 
68 Article 31 (k) of TRIPS states ‘Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) 
and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be 
anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the 
amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of 
authorization if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur’ 
69 Article 22.2 of Jordan’s Patent Law No.71 states “For the purposes of item (1) of this paragraph, and without 
prejudice to the provisions of the related International Conventions, the importation of the subject goods of the 
patent to the kingdom shall be deemed utilization of the patent.’ 
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Jordan’s existing policy space has been ‘eroded’ by signing JUSFTA70. Jordan’s policy has been 
geared towards strengthening its patent protection71 and appeasing the US. However Jordan’s 
remaining policy space allows Jordanian representatives to implement national laws that decrease the 
negative effects of JUSFTA.  
Some academics argue that Jordan should consider amending its current IP laws, and suggest that Jordan 
consider increase spending on public health to offset the adverse impact on consumers of strengthening 
its IP relevant to pharmaceutical products.72  Other academics argue that the rules and provisions should 
be tailored to each country’s national conditions73. El-Said proposes that ‘current national and global 
models of financing and promoting medicines innovations are not working and that a new thinking 
should be adopted’.74 The author agrees that this new thinking in terms of adapting and increasing policy 
space should be encouraged and built on to achieve realistic results that will not damage international 
relations and achieve access to health.  
Jordan  could allow for policy space to be interpreted within its national laws as per Peru’s amended 
Article 4 in its Legislative Decree. 75 Article 4 of Peru’s Legislative Decree dictates exceptions and 
limitations on the right to protection of data on the grounds of protecting public health.76  Jordan could 
incorporate a similar article in its Patent Law No. 28 Act of 2007.  
Overhauling Jordan’s IP system  
Overhauling Jordan’s IP system means that Jordan could examine and update its laws closely to 
streamline its laws to achieve greater access to medicine. Australia has updated its laws and focused 
on six key areas which it considered essential.77 Jordan’s Patent Law No.32 of 1999 has been 
amended twice, in 2001 and in 2007. In an effort to streamline laws it may be beneficial to have one 
legal document with all the amendments, to Jordan’s Patent Law, rather than three separate pieces of 
law which repeal certain articles and add other articles into Jordan’s Patent Law. Australia’s Patent 
Act has been consolidated and a simplified outline of the laws was produced to assist Australian 
courts.  
                                               
70 Correa states that other than FTAs representing threat to policy space also WIPO’s initiative to develop a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty . C. Correa, Designing Patent Policies Suited to Developing Countries Needs, 10 
Econômica, Rio De Janeiro 82, 87, 2008 (Hereafter Correa 2008) 
71 Correa 2008 
72 R.B. Abbott, Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property in Jordan (July 23, 2012). Intellectual Property 
Watch, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116096 
73 K. C. Shedlen Intellectual property, trade and development: can foes be friends? Global Governance, 2007 13 
(2). 171-177. ISSN 1075-2846 
74 El-Said 2016 
75 Article 4 of Peru’s Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14, 2009, art. 2 (Peru), 
El-Said 2016. Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol31/iss3/2 
76 Ibid 
77 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 available at: https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/legislation/raising-bar-act 
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Moreover, Singapore’s Patent Act produced a revised edition of its patent laws which incorporates 
amendments.78 A consolidated streamlined approach will make it easier for the Jordanian courts to 
make necessary decisions especially at times of emergencies.  
 
The author contends, however, that a more robust exercise of overhauling Jordan’s IP system and 
updating all of Jordan’s national laws, will happen as a result of a consultation with the US. The US 
seems to be the catalyst for Jordan’s IP decisions. For example, Jordan JFDA partnership agreement 
with USAID, which reduces the registration time by twelve months , was forecasted to “boost 
pharmaceutical exports by as much as JD 17 million, yielding an additional JD21.6 million in revenue 
over the same period.”79 The partnership also streamlined the process of drug testing and building of 
JFDA staff so that drugs reach the Jordanian market 80. This partnership, however will ensure that the 
US’s agenda will carry the day but nevertheless, it increases access to medicine without impairing 
Jordan’s relationship with the US .  
 
Cap on Drug Prices 
 
The Jordanian government could also put a cap on drug prices. Jordan’s current pricing system 
depends on the pricing of originator country’s pricing.81 There are provisions in place to regulate 
drugs prices but these are not always followed. For example, a first time locally manufactured generic 
drug is priced at around 75-80% of the originator’s company’s price. 82 Further drugs in the same 
category are priced according to the lowest price for other branded drugs. Imported generics pricing 
differs as the price in the drug’s originator country as well as neighbouring countries are considered. 
Patented drugs’ pricing depends on the originator country and ‘several’ European countries where the 
drug is registered along with ‘the price of similar products, if any, within Jordan and the extent to 
which Jordanian patients can benefit from the introduction of a new drug.’83 This is in comparison 
with other similar economies as per the Colombian example.84 It should be noted, however, that this 
                                               
78 See WIPO, Singapore, Patents Act (Chapter 221) (Revised Edition 2005, as amended up to the Patents 
(Amendments) Act 2017), https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/18280  
79 JFDA, ‘Jordan Food and Drug Administration Partners with USAID to Boost Competitiveness of 
Pharmaceutical Industry’,  4 April 2017, available on 
http://www.jfda.jo/DetailsPage/Ar/NewsDetails.aspx?PID=388, last accessed on 20 August 2018 
80 Jordan times, ‘JFDA partners with USAID to boost pharmaceutical industry’, April 2017 available at 
http://jordantimes.com/news/local/jfda-partners-usaid-boost-pharmaceutical-industry  
81 K. Singh, (2012, Jun 10). Cost-based pricing to hit exports, says Indian pharmaceutical alliance 
pharmaceuticals]. The Economic Times Retrieved from 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1019441170?accountid=17233 
82  Global Investment House, Jordan Pharmaceutical Sector The healing touch of Dead Sea, June 2007, available 
on http://www.jordanecb.org/library/634448627045122500.pdf   
83  Ibid 
84 Rodríguez-Garavito 2014  
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has not necessarily reaped benefits as drug prices remained high in Colombia. The stance, however, 
would be a shift in the right direction for Jordanians’ access to medicine.  
 
India ,for example, has managed to fix prices of 348 essential drugs and their combinations making 
them more affordable to patients .85 The method used is a cost based price mechanism which regulates 
prices of drugs comprising of 74 bulk ingredients.86 
 
Recommendations on Patentability Criteria 
Jordan should consider restricting the  scope of patentability in its IP law, and in particular, consider 
replicating India’s definition of scope of patentability as mentioned previously . 87 
 
Article 22 paragraph 1088 of JUSFTA protects new uses of known substances. JUSFTA includes 
exceptions for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods and, although JUSFTA does not cite 
plants or animals as patentable, it does not exclude them from patentability.89 
The definition of  an NCE in Jordan, above, does not include ‘products that contain salts, esters, or 
variants of active principles already incorporated in products’90 and Jordan may amend its national 
regulation to ‘limit the protection to cases where there is a new “active moiety”, as provided for under 
US legislation.’91 This, in effect, means ‘protection should not be granted to test data relating to 
products containing chemical entities with a functional unit contained in a previously approved 
product, such as when marketing approval of a prodrug for an already registered drug is applied for.’92  
Jordan could go further in restricting the definition of an NCE as per the Peruvian government where 
this is defined in great detail.93 Article 2 of Peru’s Amended Legislative Decree No. 1072 states:   
                                               
85 Supra 89 
86 Ibid 
87 Malpani 2007. 
88 G.P Krikorian, D.M and Szymkowiak, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Making: The Evolution of 
Intellectual Property Provisions in US Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicine’. The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property, 2007, 10: 388–418. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-1796.2007.00328.x ( Hereafter Krikorian and 
Szymkowiak 2007)  
89 Ibid 
90 Correa 2017. 
91 Section 505(b) of the US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act; article 4.2(i) of the Malaysian Directive on 
Data Exclusivity, 2011, available at http://npra.moh.gov.my/images/reg-info/DataEx/Directive_on_DE.pdf, as 
quoted in Correa 2017.  
92 Correa 2017. 
93 Peru’s Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14, 2009, art. 2 (Peru), El-Said 2016. 
Available at: h p://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol31/iss3/2 
 16 
“A new chemical entity is understood as a biologically active fraction, responsible for the 
pharmacological or physiological action of an active principle, which at the moment of the Sanitary 
Registration request has not been included in sanitary registrations previously granted in the country.  
Under no circumstance, will NCE be considered as:  
1. Different therapeutic uses or indications from those authorized in other previous sanitary 
registrations of the same chemical entity or combinations of known chemical entities.  
2. The changes in the way of administrating it, in the dosage ways, in the modifications in 
pharmacokinetics, in the dissolving time and in the bioavailability, authorized in other 
previous sanitary registrations of the same chemical entity.  
3. The changes in pharmaceutical forms or in formulations of chemical entities already 
registered.  
4. The salts (including salts with hydrogen bonds), esters, ethers, complexes, chelates, 
clathrates, isomers, metabolites, co-crystals, polyphorms, solvates, pure forms, particle sizes, 
prodrugs, or those chemical structures notwithstanding their forms, disposition or expression 
that are based on a previously registered chemical entity.  
5. The combination of an already known chemical entity and a new one.”94  
Colombia has also been able to limit the effects of its Colombia-US FTA by introducing 7 exceptions 
in its Decree 2085 of 2002 which is similar to what has been suggested and the most relevant 
exceptions state that:  
“Protection does not apply to: 
2. Data on chemical entities that are already in the market. Thus, protection does not apply to minor 
changes to such data, e.g., those pertaining to new usages of a drug that has already been patented, 
new combinations of known chemical entities, new dosages, or different packaging. 95 
3. Information on a new chemical entity that is similar to another one that has been commer- cialized 
in Colombia and whose protection period has expired. 96 
….. 
                                               
94 WIPO, Article 2, Legislative Decree N° 1072 Protection Of Undisclosed Test Data Or Other Undisclosed 
Data Related To Pharmaceutical Products available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/pe/pe047en.pdf  
95 Supra 63 
96 Ibid  
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5. Data on a new chemical entity that is not commercialized within a year from the expedition of the 
marketing authorization.”97 
Other terms that can also be defined in favour of widening the scope of Jordanian’s access to 
medicine within policy are “unfair commercial use,” “considerable effort,” and “necessary to protect 
the public.”98 
Jordan could go one step further and emulate the Australian example by raising the quality of granted 
patents by aligning patentability standards with international standards.99Australia has been able to 
raise the quality of its granted patents by targeting the inventive and innovative step100, usefulness101, 
provisional specification102, disclosure in patent applications103, fair basis104, priority dates,105 
                                               
97 Ibid 
98 Shreya Matilal, ‘Do Developing Countries Need a Pharmaceutical Data-exclusivity 
Regime?’, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 268, 272−75 (2010), Armouti and Nsour 2016 
99 “The IP Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 is Australia's biggest intellectual property (IP) system 
overhaul in twenty years. The Act came into full effect on 15 April 2013.’ Australia’s Patent Act 1990 available 
at: https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/legislation/raising-bar-act  
100 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 subsection 7(2) and 7(4) ‘removes the geographical limitation on the common 
general knowledge when assessing inventive step in a standard patent application and innovative step in an 
innovation patent. Subsection 7(3) – removes the requirement that prior 
art documents for inventive step be limited to only those documents that would have been ‘ascertained, 
understood and regarded as relevant’ by the skilled person.’, Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Intellectual 
Property Reform in Australia: A summary of important legislative changes’, July 2013, IP Australia, available 
at https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/ip_reform_in_australia_july_2013_final.pdf  
101 Australia’s Patent Act 1990  at Section 7A stipulates that the patent specification must include a specific, 
substantial and credible use for the invention. 
102 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 at ‘subsection 40(1)- raises the standard for disclosure in provisional 
specifications. A provisional application will only provide a valid priority date for an invention later claimed in 
a complete application if the provisional specification discloses the invention in a manner that is clear and 
complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art. This sets a similar 
standard to that required for disclosure in complete application’  Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Intellectual 
Property Reform in Australia: A summary of important legislative changes’, July 2013, IP Australia, available 
at https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/ip_reform_in_australia_july_2013_final.pdf  
 
103 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 at ‘Paragraph 40(2)(a) – replaces the full description requirement with the 
requirement that the specification discloses the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete 
enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art. This better aligns 
the Australian requirement for disclosure in a complete specification with the requirements elsewhere and 
ensures that the description provides sufficient information to make the invention across the full width of the 
claims’.  
104 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 ‘Subsection 40(3) – replaces ‘fair basis’ with the requirement that the claims are 
fully supported by the description. This better aligns the Australian standards for claim scope with overseas 
standards.’  
105 Australia’s Patent Act 1990  at  ‘Subsection 43(2) – aligns the standard for disclosure in a priority document 
with the standard for disclosure document discloses the invention in a manner that is clear and complete enough 
for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art. This ensures that an applicant cannot 
secure a priority date based on a speculative or incomplete disclosure. This is the same as the disclosure 
standard in a provisional application and aligns Australian standards for disclosure in priority documents with 
most other jurisdictions.’  
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preliminary search and opinion106, examination and re-examination of standard patents107, standard of 
proof108, non-allowable amendments109, amending definitions such as inserting ‘preliminary search 
and opinion’.110 In addition to raising examination standards and expanded examination grounds and 
higher standards of proof111 which has resulted in a simplified IP system that got rid of unnecessary 
hurdles and ‘easier to use in a global setting’.112  
Conclusion  
There is policy space that the Jordanian government could utilise to hinder the effects of TRIPS-plus. 
Jordan’s data exclusivity clauses are the most harmful to Jordan’s access to medicine. However, this 
article offers practical solutions to scale back Jordan’s data exclusivity restraints as implemented by 
other countries that have signed similar terms with the US.  
 
This research  builds on the recommendations of the JFDA by advocating further measures for the 
Jordanian government to increase its access to medicine. Jordan could restrict definitions such as NCE, 
patentability criteria and bar second use patenting, a decision that would prevent ‘evergreening’ of 
existing patents  thus maintain wide access to medicines.113 Jordan’s laws could also allow for policy 
                                               
106 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 at ‘Section 43 - allows the Commissioner to conduct a PSO on a standard 
application filed on or after 15 April 2013. An applicant will be able to request a PSO on a complete application. 
This will be similar to an international search and opinion and will provide applicants and the public with early 
information about the likely patentability of inventions where no search and examination report is likely to be 
made available from another office’. 
107 Sections 45, 98, 101G, 101M – expand the grounds considered during examination of a standard patent 
application, a standard patent and an innovation patent, and during opposition of an innovation patent, to include 
usefulness and prior use. This ensures that the Commissioner can examine on all of the substantive grounds 
available during opposition and court revocation proceedings. 
108 Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Intellectual Property Reform in Australia: A summary of important 
legislative changes’, July 2013, IP Australia, available at 
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/ip_reform_in_australia_july_2013_final.pdf  
109 These are found in sections 102, 114 and 114A of Australia’s Patent Act 1990 see Commonwealth of 
Australia 2013, Intellectual Property Reform in Australia: A summary of important legislative changes’, July 
2013, IP Australia, available at 
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/ip_reform_in_australia_july_2013_final.pdf  
110  Australia Patent Act 1990 at ‘Section 3 - inserts ‘preliminary search and opinion’ (PSO)                                                                
(c), 52(2), 74(1), 74(3), 103(2), 106(1)(b), 106(4), 107(1) 
(b0, 107(4), 150(2), 151(2), 215(3), 223(2A)9b), 223(6A) amend existing references to the Commissioner being                                                         
‘balance of probabilities’.  
111  Australia Patent Act 1990 at ‘Section 3 - inserts ‘preliminary search and opinion’ (PSO)                                                                
(c), 52(2), 74(1), 74(3), 103(2), 106(1)(b), 106(4), 107(1) 
(b0, 107(4), 150(2), 151(2), 215(3), 223(2A)9b), 223(6A) amend existing references to the Commissioner being                                                         
‘balance of probabilities’.  
112 Australia’s Patent Act 1990 available at:  
 https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/legislation/raising-bar-act 
113 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Creative Lawmaking: A Comment on Lionel Bently, Copyright, Translations, and 
Relations between Britain and India in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
1243, 1247 (2007), Beatrice Lindstrom Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus An Analysis of Intellectual Property 




space to be interpreted within its national laws as per Peru’s Amended Article 4 in its Legislative 
Decree.114The Jordanian government could put a cap on the drug prices in comparison with other similar 
economies. Consequently Jordan could attempt to overhaul its national legislation to streamline its IP. 
The Jordanian government should, ideally, have its decisions backed by the US to maintain its 
relationship with the US and not feature in the USTR’s 301 Report’s Watch List.  
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